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Major disasters such as extreme weather events can magnify and exacerbate pre-existing 
social disparities, with disadvantaged populations bearing disproportionate costs. Despite 
the implications for equity and emergency planning, we lack a quantitative understanding 
of how these social fault lines translate to different behaviors in large-scale emergency 
contexts. Here we investigate this problem in the context of Hurricane Harvey, using over 
30 million anonymized GPS records from over 150,000 opted-in users in the Greater 
Houston Area to quantify patterns of disaster-inflicted relocation activities before, during, 
and after the shock. We show that evacuation distance is highly homogenous across 
individuals from different types of neighborhoods classified by race and wealth, obeying a 
truncated power-law distribution. Yet here the similarities end: we find that both race and 
wealth strongly impact evacuation patterns, with disadvantaged minority populations less 
likely to evacuate than wealthier white residents. Finally, there are considerable 
discrepancies in terms of departure and return times by race and wealth, with strong social 
cohesion among evacuees from advantaged neighborhoods in their destination choices. 
These empirical findings bring new insights into mobility and evacuations, providing policy 
recommendations for residents, decision makers, and disaster managers alike. 
Natural hazards continue to threaten lives and property around the world, killing nearly 12,000 
people and causing $130 billion US damage in 2019 alone1  Societies have set up a variety of 
ways to mitigate extreme weather events such as flooding; the most effective involves removing 
residents from vulnerable areas in advance of the hazard.  Evacuations are not without 
challenges, however: effective departure may be impeded by severe traffic, city-level dwindling 
resources (e.g., fuel shortage, etc.), and uninhabitable shelter conditions2–4. Understanding the 
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underlying patterns of collective, abrupt displacement is therefore crucial for emergency 
management agencies to execute comprehensive, well-ordered plans5.  
 
There has been an increasing interest in linking social vulnerability to disasters through 
frameworks such as equity and environmental justice6. Previous studies suggest that minority 
populations from disadvantaged neighborhoods are more likely to be affected by disasters7. 
Examinations of Hurricane Katrina, for example, showed that black and poor residents of New 
Orleans suffered disproportionately severe impacts8. Further, race and class gaps are present 
from the preparation to response phases of shocks as well as through the recovery period9,10. 
Much research has argued that White communities are better prepared for disasters than 
communities of color and that White residents return at higher rates than Black or Hispanic 
residents11,12.  Another study using post-disaster survey data of residents affected by 2012 
tornadoes shows that households with more advantaged characteristics such as social capital and 
social ties recover faster from the disaster13. Despite these critical findings, there is still a lack of 
large-scale quantitative research on the impact of wealth and racial difference on disaster 
evacuation and return. To this end, scholars have typically relied on retrospective surveys and 
interviews14,15 which face challenges such as sample bias, faulty retrospective recall, and low 
response rates16,17. 
 
Recently, GPS-enabled devices which generate unprecedented amounts of mobility data have 
enabled more nuanced studies of behavior18–21, including in large-scale disasters and extreme 
events22,23, allowing the construction of probabilistic models24,25, and highlighting the importance 
of social networks26–28 and socio-economic factors10.  By comparing multiple disasters, certain 
typical behaviors have been established, including an exponential return rate29.   
 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall on August 25th, 2017 and to-date is rivaled only by Hurricane 
Katrina as the costliest tropical cyclone on record. It was accompanied by wind speeds as high as 
130 mph and more than 50 inches of rain, making it the wettest tropical cyclone in history and 
leaving no part of the city unscathed.  Yet despite this hurricane’s magnitude, authorities did not 
order a mandatory evacuation in Houston, providing a rare example of widespread evacuation 
that occurred emergently through countless individual decisions, without the intervention of the 
state.  
 
Here, we take Hurricane Harvey as a case study, and use anonymized mobility data to identify 
detailed evacuation behavior. We then link the observed behavior with information on wealth 
and race at the level of the census block group—the smallest spatial unit of reporting of the US 
Census. This allows us to quantify the extent to which these socioeconomic factors impacted 
evacuation behavior.  We show how these disparities influenced not only who evacuated, but 
also where they evacuated to, when they evacuated and how long they remained evacuated. 
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Houston itself is an ideal testbed to study the disparities of interest, being the fourth most 
populous city in the US and hosting a racially and economically diverse population.  
 
We use anonymized data generated by more than 2 million opted-in mobile devices between July 
1, 2017 to October 1, 2017 to illuminate the class and race interactions with disaster evacuation 
and recovery. More details about the data can be found in SI Section 1, Data Description. We 
present a multi-scale study of disaster-induced evacuations of Hurricane Harvey looking at who 
left, where they went, and how long they were gone. First, we infer residents’ evacuation status 
and destination using spatial data analysis. We then examine the socio-demographic differences 
across the Houston metropolitan statistical area and integrate the information with the 
distributions of spatial and temporal patterns at the individual level. Finally, we use residential 
home neighborhood characteristics capturing both race and wealth to illuminate the differences 
in disaster responses across all affected regions. 
 
Results 
 
Who evacuated? 
When Hurricane Harvey approached the Texas coastline, officials did not instruct the populace 
in Houston to evacuate. And yet, a significant percentage of the population chose to evacuate 
anyway. Without fine-grained data, it is difficult to determine to what extent there were patterns 
of evacuation based on location or socioeconomic features. Based on our analysis of the mobility 
data, we were able to detect 10,179 unique evacuees and 141,828 non-evacuees, indicating that 
6.7 percent of the total population evacuated, on par with the official reports. However, as we 
show in Fig. 1, this baseline evacuation rate varied substantially across different locations and 
neighborhood types. In addition to a higher evacuation rate closer to the coast, we also identify 
many inland areas with evacuation levels as high as the coastal areas, such as Fort Bend and East 
Houston areas (Fig. 1a). We further identify two distinct geographic patterns for long-distance 
(90th percentile, >41.25 km) and short-distance (10th percentile, <2.71 km) evacuations, 
respectively. Whereas long-distance evacuation was almost entirely directed from the coastline 
inland, short-distance evacuation occurred in distinct, concentrated pockets across the MSA. 
 
We studied social disparity by classifying six types of neighborhoods. A neighborhood in this 
study is a census block group, a geographical unit used by the United States Census Bureau. 
Each block group contains between 600 and 3,000 residents. We divided the census block groups 
in the Greater Houston area into six classes based on the wealth level (using a threshold of 25% 
of the residents below the federal poverty level) and the majority racial group (with a threshold 
of 50%): non-poor Black, non-poor Hispanic, non-poor White and poor Black, poor Hispanic, 
and poor White.  We also conducted a sensitivity analysis by setting different thresholds on the 
poverty level and the majority racial group; the results can be found in SI Section 3 Sensitivity 
Analysis. 
  4 
To investigate both geographical and sociodemographic features of the evacuation mobility flow 
induced by Hurricane Harvey, we start with a multivariate kernel density estimate with Gaussian 
kernels on both origins and destinations (see Materials and Methods) to produce the contour plot 
of net flow density in each 100 m x 100 m grid. We then compare all evacuees’ residential block 
group characteristics (see Table 1) with the population breakdown to show the percentage 
difference as the relative evacuation rate. 
 
 
Type Number of 
Block 
Groups 
Total 
Population 
(ACS 2018)  
Total 
Devices 
Identified 
Population 
Baseline 
Ratio 
Device 
Baseline 
Ratio 
Non-Poor Black 261 551,779 11,029 0.112 0.076 
Non-Poor 
Hispanic 
624 1,282,879 27,192 0.261 0.188 
Non-Poor White 1064 2,278,045 93,483 0.474 0.647 
Poor Black 108 166,702 3,539 0.034 0.018 
Poor Hispanic 313 598,496 9,016 0.122 0.062 
Poor White 26 36,558 1,213 0.007 0.008 
 
Table 1. Statistics of each type of neighborhoods included in this study (Total Number of Block Groups, Total 
Population and the Total Number of Active Devices) and the corresponding population percentage as the baseline 
ratios. 
 
Based on the locations from which the individuals evacuated, we can examine whether 
socioeconomic factors impacted evacuation behavior. After reweighting the mobility records to 
account for sampling bias (as described in Materials and Methods), we find that evacuees from 
non-poor majority White block groups are significantly overrepresented among evacuees, 19.8% 
more than we would expect based on their fraction of the total population (Fig. 1d). All other 
neighborhood types evacuated less than the baseline, even though flooding was comparable 
across the neighborhoods.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, individuals from poor Hispanic 
communities showed the least tendency to evacuate with 12.2% below their baseline (Fig. 1d). 
The result aligns with observations from other natural disasters. For example, wealth has also 
been shown to correlate positively with evacuation following Hurricane Irma10.  
 
Through Fig. 1(b-c) and 1(e-f) we compare the subgroup patterns based on the evacuation 
distances. Fig. 1b and 1e show the individuals who had long-distance evacuations (>41.25 km), 
i.e., moved greater than the 90th percentile of the evacuation distance distribution. Fig 1b shows 
the spatial density flow corresponds to the evacuees who travelled long distances, where we can 
observe clear hotspots along the coast moving toward the inland areas. The patterns of 
evacuation rates from different neighborhoods remain largely the same as the ones observed in 
overall evacuees. The only difference is that we observe a slight increase (4.2%) of the 
individuals from non-poor White communities when comparing it to the overall relative 
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evacuation rates (see Fig. 1e). Similarly, the evacuation discrepancy holds for those who 
relocated less than the 10th percentile (<2.71 km) even though the origins and destinations of 
evacuations are more spatially dispersed (Fig. 1c). However, nonpoor White neighborhoods are 
the only groups that provide more evacuees than their baselines (Fig.1f). 
 
 
Fig 1. Geographical and socio-demographic information on evacuation from Hurricane Harvey. a-c illustrate 
the net evacuation intensity of each 100x100m grid, defined as the difference 𝐾"!"#$ 	= 	𝐾"!%&!$ −𝐾"!%'#, where 	𝐾"!%&!$ 
(𝐾"!%'#) are KDE estimates of the probability density of home locations after (before) evacuation. These values are 
normalized to have zero mean and lie in the range [-1,1] (see Materials and Methods). As such, positive (blue) 
values correspond to an influx of resident above the baseline, with negative (red) values indicating an exodus. We 
compare the collective evacuation behavior of: all evacuees (a); evacuees who evacuated further than the 90% 
quantile (b); and evacuees who evacuated closer than the 10% quantile (c). The triangles in (a) represent reported 
fatalities and red dense cells indicate a greater rate of evacuation while the blue shaded cells reflect the likelihood as 
a relocation destination for the evacuees. The relative evacuation rates that compare the proportion difference for 
subgroups of populations are shown in (d) though (f) and an evident disparity in the evacuees’ economic and social 
compositions can be observed. 
 
Where did they go?  
In addition to detecting who left vulnerable areas during shocks, it is important to understand the 
locations to which they evacuated. This understanding is important for disaster managers who 
seek to efficiently pre-position shelters with food, water, and medical care and also for police 
officials and first responders who seek to ameliorate transportation challenges, such as gridlock. 
Without fine-grained mobility data, these remain major policy challenges. In Fig. 1 (a-c), we can 
see the general distribution of evacuation sources and destinations, but the evacuation distance is 
  6 
not discernable. We find that, despite the wide differences in evacuation rates for different 
neighborhood types discussed above, the evacuation distance follows a scale-free distribution 
with an exponential cutoff, in line with findings from other disastersError! Bookmark not 
defined.. Specifically, the distribution 𝑃(𝛥𝑑) 	= (𝛥𝑑! + 𝛥𝑑)"#𝑒𝑥𝑝	(−∆𝑑/𝐾) fits for evacuees 
from different communities with exponent value 𝛽 = 1.57, ∆𝑑! = 2.19	km and cutoff value 𝐾 = 	38.29	km. 
 
Based on this apparent universality, we might expect that the evacuation process is spatially 
uniform, with evacuation destinations determined only by one’s distance from their origin. We 
find that this is not in fact the case; there is remarkable socioeconomic homophily in evacuation 
behavior, with people from a given block group type tending to evacuate to the same block group 
type, even if it is far away. To assess this, we compute the transition matrix between block group 
types based on the origin-destination information for all evacuees. We normalize the matrix so 
that the values represent the evacuees’ fraction from a block group type who evacuated to a 
given block group type. In Fig. 2b and c we see strikingly different behavior from the spatial 
pattern. The residents from White neighborhoods have an 88.1% probability of evacuating to the 
same type of block group, while for Hispanic communities that ratio dropped to 56.8%. 
Evacuees from Black communities are the least likely to relocate to a neighborhood that is 
consistent with their original home community type (16.7%). Similarly, individuals from non-
poor communities have a 92.9% probability to relocate to a similar social background. In 
contrast, the rate drops to 35.x% for residents of poor neighbourhoods.. 
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Fig 2. Evacuation distance and 
destination choice. (a) The 
distribution of evacuation distance 
for residents from different block 
group categories; (b) the 
correspondence between 
evacuation origin and destination 
type (note: all rows sum to 1). 
There is apparent universality 
between different block group 
types when viewed from the 
probability of evacuating a given 
distance (a). But this apparent 
similarity breaks down upon 
examining destination choices, with 
residents of wealthier (b, right) 
and/or white neighbourhoods 
tending to evacuate to block groups 
of the same composition. 
 
 
 
How long were they gone?  
Evacuation duration is a key factor in disaster recovery and resilience16,30,31. Identifying the 
precise beginning and end of evacuation using the mobility data, we find that most evacuation 
departures occurred in the first few days following landfall, with 95.6% between 1 and 7 days 
following landfall. Only a few people (4.3%) evacuated in advance of landfall. In contrast, 
returns began shortly after the peak of departures but spread out over a more skewed, heavier-
tailed distribution; though most evacuees returned within two weeks, some took far longer. The 
exact dates of departure and return were determined via spatial clustering with a 3-day sliding 
window (see SI Section 2) to reflect whether an individual stabilized in a given location.  
 
As with the distance distribution, it is tempting to think that the approximately exponential return 
time distribution indicates a homogeneous behavioral pattern. Yet when we incorporate the 
sociodemographic information of each evacuee, we uncover marked socio-economic disparities. 
We perform the bootstrapping on the overall samples iteratively for the different neighborhood 
types compared to the baselines based on the cumulative evacuees and returners as a subgroup. 
From the violin plot of evacuation duration shown in Fig. 3b, we can see that, as with the spatial 
patterns, the basic statistics such as mean/median show little variation across different types of 
block groups. 90% of poor Black evacuees returned after 13 days, whereas at that point only 
75% of poor White evacuees had returned, indicating huge variability in return times. 
Additionally, the vast majority of long-duration relocations (over 30 days)involve evacuees from 
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higher social class neighborhoods (see SI Section 4). Past research has suggested that poorer 
residents have greater challenges finding new, short term housing while wealthier and better 
positioned ones can do so more easily32. 
 
 
Fig 3.  Race and wealth impacts on 
evacuation/return times. (a) The 
kernel density of both departure and 
return of relocation activities.  (b) 
Distribution of individual evacuation 
durations group by income and race 
difference in communities. Though 
most departure dates are tightly 
clustered within the first week of 
Harvey’s landfall (a, red), we find a 
right-skewed distribution of return 
dates (a, blue), with some Houston 
residents taking far longer to return 
than others. The tail of this 
distribution is form mostly of 
residents of wealthier 
neighbourhoods of all racial 
compositions (b), suggesting only 
those residents could afford long 
displacements. 
 
 
 
We are further interested in discovering whether socio-demographic factors impact the time of 
evacuation day by day, for example, to determine whether certain groups are more likely to have 
evacuated immediately upon landfall or to have waited. A similar question regards return from 
evacuation: on a given day, which groups are over or underrepresented? To address these 
questions, we compute the disparity rate in departure and return times. Due to the limited number 
data points in certain block group types, we calculate two disparity rates based on two aggregations 
of neighbourhoods into i) non-poor vs. poor; and ii) white majority vs. non-white majority, as 
defined above. For each such division, we then find the relative difference in the cumulative 
number of prevalence of departures/returns on each day. The racial (wealth) disparity rate 𝐷$ for a 
given day 𝑖 is thus calculated as (𝑅$ − 𝑅)/𝑅, where 𝑅 is the total fraction of evacuees coming 
from white (non-poor)  neighborhoods while 𝑅$  is the same fraction, but only including 
evacuations/departures up to day 𝑖. High values of 𝐷$ thus indicate that evacuations (or returns) 
from white or non-poor neighbourhoods were overrepresented up to time 𝑖 in the process. 
 
Fig. 4a indicates that while most departures took place within a short period, the social 
disparities persist along the temporal dimension. In terms of poverty (or wealth), we see that for 
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those who departed prior to the disaster, the percentage of residents from wealthy neighborhoods 
is over 50% higher than that of all evacuees. Such variation presents a steady decrease as the 
hurricane strikes the city and falls below 50% after the first day of the landfall.  We also observe 
that the standard deviation is notably larger in the early days which is due to the small number of 
early evacuees.  
 
Overall the disparity rates along the wealth dimension were positive over multiple days, 
suggesting that the people with higher income were more likely to evacuate ahead of those with 
lower wages. The trend based on race also shows that evacuees from neighborhoods with higher 
White-population ratios were more likely to evacuate early, yet right after the landfall people 
from disadvantaged block groups comprised more of the evacuees (with about 10% higher than 
the baseline). Overall, both income and race disparity metrics indicate that majorities of early 
evacuees comprise people from potential higher social classes, yet this disparity decreases at a 
steady pace.  
 
When we project the disproportionate effect of return behavior over the period between 28 
August and 17 September which is shown in Fig. 4b, we observe that, like the departure 
behavior, the returners’ daily disparities show greater class than racial difference.  We consider 
Day 5 after Harvey as the beginning of the return period based on local news and weather reports 
verifying rainfall had stopped and Day 23 as the end, based on the 95th quantile of the overall 
return time. We see that early returners, especially those who came back to their homes in less 
than 3 days, primarily came from the wealthy communities. However, this class disparity effect 
continues to decline with a greater proportion of poor evacuees returning and reaches equity 2 
weeks after the disaster. Such class differences increase monotonically, reaching the same 
proportion after 3 weeks, at which point most of the evacuees have returned to their homes in 
Houston. 
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Fig 4. Time progression of 
class and racial disparity in 
evacuation and return. The 
vertical axis shows the relative 
disparity in the cumulative 
numbers of departures (a) and 
returns (b) over time, between 
residents of poor vs. non-poor 
neighbourhoods (squares), and 
white vs. non-white 
neighbourhoods (circles). A 
positive value on a given day 
indicates a disproportionate 
number of people from white 
or non-poor neighbourhoods 
having evacuated (returned) 
up to that point. 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, we estimate the extent to which the evacuation and recovery timing varied by race and 
class by computing the daily disparity rate. We find that a small percentage of the overall 
evacuees (4.3%) responded to Harvey and relocated before its landfall. The low rate of 
evacuation may be because urban residents collectively perceived a low level of risk in the 
absence of mandatory evacuation orders in Houston. Particularly among early evacuees there are 
marked disparities, suggesting that the ratio of the wealthy residents has a 50% jump compared 
to the evacuee baseline and 25% for the ratio of people residing in White majority 
neighborhoods. As expected, the class and racial minority proportion of the evacuees increases 
steadily after Harvey's arrival. This finding confirms that minorities are at higher risks of 
disruption and adverse impacts. This behavioral difference indicates that income level could be a 
contributing factor in early-evacuation decision-making. Further, disparities in terms of time 
away indicate that income plays an important role. We can see that the proportion of evacuees 
from disadvantaged communities started increasing as the storm ended, echoing previous 
studies10,16 that class and housing ownership has a strong impact on return dates. 
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Discussion 
Our analysis of three months of detailed human mobility data before, during, and after Hurricane 
Harvey reveals the complexity of disaster response patterns, exhibiting both universality and 
heterogeneity in different dimensions. We first quantify the wealth and racial disparity in terms 
of the overall evacuee composition as well as the intra-urban displacement patterns. By 
examining these hotspots, we find that three of the peaks correspond to areas with high fatalities 
while the other hotspots to the southwest of downtown Houston had no fatalities.  We further 
observe that non-poor White populations were the most likely to evacuate, for evacuations of all 
distances. There are several plausible reasons for such class and race differences, including 
uneven access to transportation, inequitable regional development and perhaps even different 
levels of preparedness and perceived risks. In Harvey’s case, with no evacuation order declared 
for Houston, the evacuation decision process may have taken place with little prior planning, 
increasing the role of financial resources and social networks in making such decisions.  
 
Furthermore, we extract the spatial and temporal features of evacuation activities and investigate 
the heterogeneity among different residential groups for each metric. There is a high degree of 
universality in evacuation distance after comparing the evacuees’ distributions from different 
types of communities. This finding aligns with previous studies based on similar extreme 
disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes, indicating that evacuation during Harvey followed 
the heavy-tailed human movement pattern of past crises. The overall temporal features 
demonstrate limited impact from differences in the socio-demographic features of communities. 
For most of the block groups, the evacuees’ displacement duration was less than one week while 
residents from more affluent communities were displaced for longer. It is also notable that 
displacements longer than 30 days are disproportionately residents of socio-economically 
advantaged neighbourhoods. The longer exodus is likely because only the wealthy possess the 
financial resources to afford a longer stay away; those with low incomes would struggle with 
limited resources and potentially higher burdens. 
 
Even with the high spatial and temporal resolution of our data, our analysis is not without 
limitations. First, we have focused only on mobility in Houston MSA during a three-month 
period between July and October 2017. Larger areas and longer observation windows would be 
required to detect larger (e.g., out of state) displacements and long-term impacts such as 
permanent relocations. A second limitation is the sampling bias amongst different communities 
owing to different penetration rates of smart devices. Though we have made efforts to quantify 
and mitigate this bias through resampling (see Material and Methods, Sampling Bias 
Correction), ensuring data balance remains a challenge. Third and finally, our analysis of race 
and class has not fully controlled for other features known to impact evacuation behavior, such 
as home damage, infrastructure conditions, and strength of social ties. We have tested a 
regression model incorporating data on flooded roads to capture infrastructure conditions and 
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found the overall predictive power of that factor is not significant (see SI Section 5, Evacuation 
Rate Prediction). Nonetheless, additional information about the urban fabric—encompassing 
both physical and social infrastructure—is needed to fully understand the complex interplay 
between race, wealth, and disaster outcomes. 
 
The significance of income levels in determining evacuation response, with wealthier residents 
evacuating earlier, longer, and at a higher overall rate, indicates that some residents may have 
preferred to evacuate but judged that the costs of evacuation were too high, and they therefore 
took on the risks of staying put. This impossible choice between physical harm and economic 
harm is a recurring theme, notably in the very different crisis of COVID-19. In the first wave of 
spring 2020, compliance with social distancing guidelines was significantly lower in low-income 
neighborhoods across the United States33,34. This points to potential interventions in the form of 
temporary financial incentives, government messaging, and/or preferential allocation of 
resources aimed at ameliorating the unequal effects of major urban disruptions. 
 
Material and Methods 
 
Data and Preprocessing 
We use mobility data provided by Cuebiq (www.cuebiq.com), a leading private sector firm that 
handles human mobility data with anonymized identifiers and guarantees user privacy. Prior 
studies have used these and similar data sets to understand commuting patterns35, accessibility to 
public resources36, neighborhood connectedness37, and social distancing during epidemics38,39.  
We confine the geographical bounds to the Houston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and 
collect the de-identified mobility data for a three-month period overlapping with Hurricane 
Harvey (July 1st to September 30th, 2017), comprising over 3 billion geographical records from 
over 2.5 million unique anonymous users who opted-in to share their location data anonymously 
for research purposes. Due to differences in hardware/software among the devices in the dataset, 
the GPS coordinates therein possess different levels of spatial noise. We adopt a uniform 
minimum spatial granularity of 50 m by implementing an established stay-point algorithm40,41 to 
extract meaningful stays and filter out transient locations. The algorithm works by processing a 
de-identified GPS trajectory (timestamped sequence of latitude/longitude pairs) into a series of 
geographic regions where the user has a stay duration surpassing a specified threshold. The 
effect is to compress trajectories, allowing efficient analysis of individual mobility patterns; each 
anonymized device’s trajectory becomes a series of stay points encoded as tuples of the form 
(latitude, longitude, start_time, end_time). Throughout this study, we use temporal and spatial 
thresholds of 5 minutes and 50 meters, respectively. To minimize the impact of tourists and other 
non-residents, we retain only users who have at least data points from at least 60 unique days and 
at least 100 stay points. This filtering leaves roughly 30 million data points corresponding to 
roughly 150,000 unique, anonymous users. The detailed data specifications are shown in SI 
Table 1.  
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Sampling Bias Correction 
A potential challenge with crowdsourced large-scale mobility data is the inherent bias in 
sampling rates for different populations. To test how this may confound the results that follow, 
for each block group we compare the number of devices in the dataset with the total population 
reported in the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS 2018), as detailed in SI Section 1.3 
Data Representativeness. We observe strong correlation between the two datasets, although the 
distributions do not align perfectly. 
 
To minimize potential bias, we employ two strategies: i) a weighting procedure, in which we 
weight each block group according to the ratio of number of actively reporting devices to the 
reported population based on ACS 2018. By comparing both the unweighted and weighted 
results, we can gauge the magnitude of deviation of the results caused by the sampling bias. 
However, in the case when the subgroup of evacuees was small or where evacuees from a small 
number of specific neighborhoods predominate, the sampling bias from those neighborhoods can 
appear to be more prominent than the neighborhood disparity. Therefore, we also ii) bootstrap 
the samples from each block group with uniform sampling rate proportional to the population 
with 100 iterations. 
Home Census Block Group Detection 
For every anonymized device in the dataset, we first determine the home locations prior to the 
landfall of the disaster by identifying the weekly primary locations using stay points overlapping 
the weekday evenings (8 pm to 7 am). We then apply an agglomerative clustering method using 
complete linkage42 (enforcing a maximum spatial diameter threshold of 50 m to each cluster) and 
assign the cluster region with the longest cumulative stay duration as the candidate home census 
block groups. In addition, a threshold of minimum two different days has been applied to 
mitigate the uncertainty of unbalanced usage across different evenings. After obtaining 5 
consecutive weeks of potential home census block groups for each individual, we perform a 
weekly cross-validation with tolerance of only one week missing or mismatch, using 50 m as the 
maximum deviation Haversine distance in consistency of the stay-point accuracy. 
Evacuation Detection 
To determine each user’s evacuation status and identify the corresponding evacuation and return 
time, we use the cross-validated home location (above) for each user as the prime baseline 
location. The key challenges are the uncertainty for daily reported data as well as the uncertainty 
of mislabeling short trips as evacuations.  We therefore introduce a sliding time window (testing 
both 5 and 7 days) to mitigate such risks and iteratively identify the primary home locations of 
each sliding time window, computing the deviation distance to the prime location. Within each 
rolling time window, we apply the same home detection technique and determine primary 
location. If a departure of at least three consecutive calendar days from home is observed, we 
consider this user as a potential evacuee and label the new primary location as the evacuation 
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destination. We used a 1 km distance threshold of evacuation for the cluster maximal diameter 
from 50 m to, in order cope with the fact that the accuracy of signal and cellular service could be 
affected by Hurricane Harvey.  The middle date of the time window is taken as the date of 
departure. 
Net Evacuation Intensity Estimation   
In order to estimate the geographical patterns of intra-urban relocation, we use non-parametric 
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) to evaluate the net migration intensity for each urban grid s 
denoted as 𝐾=%&'( . Specifically, we use the pre-disaster and post-disaster latitudinal and 
longitudinal information of all evacuee's detected home locations as inputs for two KDE models 
that capture the probability density of home locations before and after evacuation, respectively. 
Each density function 𝑓? has the following form: 
 𝑓?(𝑠) = 	A 1𝑛𝑟) 𝐾 D𝑑$,%𝑟 E&$+,  
 
where 𝑠 represents a specific location of interest and	𝑟 denotes the bandwidth of the KDE 
estimate, which relates to model resolution. In this study we and Gaussian kernel function K, 
with 𝑟 = 100 m. Here, 𝑖 runs over all 𝑛 home stay points in the time period of interest, and 𝑑$,% is 
the Haversine (geodesic) distance between home location 𝑖 and the location of interest, 𝑠.	
 
We use the set of original detected home location data of all evacuees and construct the spatial 
density function 𝐾=%-.'. Similarly, we can obtain 𝐾=%-/%(with the post-evacuation destination. We 
then compute the evacuation intensity of each area as 𝐾=%&'( 	= 	𝐾=%-/%( − 𝐾=%-.'.  In order to 
facilitate the comparison of contour surfaces based on different subgroups with varying sample 
size, the final values of 𝐾=%&'( are normalized to have zero mean and lie in the range [-1, 1]. This 
allows us to easily depict influxes (outfluxes) of people above/below the baseline. 
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